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1. INTRODUCTION
Several recent decisions in state courts vacating multi-million dollar
arbitration awards have garnered significant attention from the media due
to the size of the award vacated.! A subsidiary issue, however, has
escaped attention: the courts' inconsistent use of the preemption
doctrine2 under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)3 to preempt state
statutory grounds governing motions to vacate. The FAA preemption
doctrine provides that the federal substantive law of arbitrability4
preempts conflicting state laws in federal and state court.5 For example,
in Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc.,6 a panel in New York's Appellate
Division, First Department vacated a $25 million punitive damages
I. See, e.g., Gary Young, Courts Are Increasingly Intervening in Arbitration
Cases, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 28, 2003, at A15; Tamara Loomis, $25 Million Arbitration
Award Is Upset, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 13, 2003, at I (reporting on Appellate Division's
vacatur of punitive damages portion of $27 million arbitration award in Sawtelle v.
Waddelle & Reed, Inc., 754 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)); Tamara Loomis,
Recent Ruling Vacates $28 Million Findingfor Claimant, N.Y.L.!., Jan. 16,2003, at
5 (reporting on Appellate Division, First Department's vacation of award in Sands
Bros. & Co. v. Generex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 720 N.Y.S.2d 450 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001)); Tom Perrotta, $5.7 Million Securities Arbitration Award Nullified, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 17, 2001, at I (reporting on Supreme Court's vacation of award in In re
Arbitration Between UBS Warburg L.L.c. and Auerbach, Pollak & Richardson Inc.,
744 N.Y.S.2d 364 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)).
2. See infra notes 36-81 and accompanying text.
3. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2003).
4. Arbitrability refers to "whether the parties agreed to submit the claim to
arbitration." Barbara Black, Securities Arbitration is Not Supposed To Be So
Complicated: Arbitrability, the Eligibility Rule, and Whose Law Decides, 30 SEC.
REG. LJ. 134, 137 (2002).
5. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I (1983);
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
6. 754 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
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award arising out of an employment dispute in the securities industry, on
the ground that the arbitrators "completely ignored applicable law" in
awarding punitive damages to the claimant.7 Without discussion-other
than an acknowledgement that the FAA governs employment disputes in
the securities industry-the court summarily decided the threshold issue
that the standard of review of the award was found in section 10 of the
FAA and the federal judicially created "manifest disregard of the law"
test and not New York's arbitration statute.8
In contrast, two other panels of the same court applied New York
statutory grounds to motions to vacate securities arbitration awards. In
Sands Bros. & Co. v. Generex Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,9 the First
Department, also without discussion, affirmed the lower court's vacatur
of a $28 million arbitral award on state law grounds, stating that the
panel failed to comply with an earlier directive of the courtlO and that the
7. [d. at 273. Applying the United States Supreme Court's three-factor test set
forth in BMW a/North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), the court ruled that
the punitive damages award was grossly excessive in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution. As a result, the court vacated the $25
million punitive damages portion of the $27 million award. [d. at 276.
Surprisingly, on remand, the arhitration panel re-affirmed its $25 million punitive
damages award, and explicitly stated that it granted the award pursuant to the
claimant's claim under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. SECURITIES
ARBITRATION AtERT 2003-36. Again, in response to the claimant's motion to
confirm the award, the respondent cross-moved to vacate the punitive damages
award. The Supreme Court, New York County, vacated the award on the grounds
that it "failed completely to take [the holding of the Appellate Division] into
account" and directed parties to submit the issue of punitive damages to a new
panel. See Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., No. 115056/01, slip. op. at 3 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 2004).
8. Sawtelle, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
9. 749 N.Y.S.2d 17 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). Sands Bros. involved a dispute
arising out of a fmancial services agreement between a brokerage fIrm and a start-
up company. The agreement did not contain a predispute arbitration clause, but the
lower court compelled Sands Bros. to arbitrate the dispute pursuant to New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules because Sands Bros. is a NYSE member. Telephone
Interview with Richard A. Roth, Esq., Counsel for Sands Bros. (Sept. 29, 2003).
10. See Sands Bros. & Co. v. Generex Pbarms., Inc., 720 N.Y.S.2d 450 (N.Y.
App. Div. 200 I). The arbitration panel had ordered Generex to pay $28 million in
damages (mostly made up of lost profits) and to issue certain warrants to Sands.
After the Supreme Court confirmed the award, this opinion of the First Department
vacated the declaratory judgment portion of the award directing the issuance of
warrants because it was too indefinite. !d. at 451. Interestingly, in this earlier
opinion, the First Department applied both FAA and state statutory grounds to
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award was "totally irrational," a ground for reversal in New York's [Civil
Practice Law and Rules] CPLR section 7511. 11
Similarly, in In re Arbitration Between UBS Warburg L.L.c. and
Auerbach, Pollak & Richardson, Inc.,12 the First Department affinned
the trial court's vacatur on state law grounds of a $5.7 million arbitration
award in a securities dispute between brokerage firms over a fraudulent
securities transaction. The lower court had noted tersely that the parties'
arbitration agreement included a generic New York: choice of law clause
and that was why CPLR section 7511 governed the motion to vacateY
The Appellate Court did not discuss the standard of review of the award,
but wrote merely that the Suprerne Court had "properly determined" that
the panel had "manifestly disregarded the applicable 1aw.,,14
These conflicting decisions highlight the difficulties that state courts
have encountered applying the Supreme Court's current FAA preemption
jurisprudence. These difficulties focus primarily on whether the FAA
preempts in state court only substantive state rules, such as those
regulating parties' arbitration agreements, or also state arbitration law,
such as procedures governing the arbitration process. IS As a result, one
immediate challenge for scholars, litigants, and judges will be to
reconcile the various Supreme Court preemption cases to come up with a
cohesive doctrine for state courts to apply to arbitration decisions.16
One area where the struggle is in its infancy is in the vacatur
context: where a losing party to an arbitration award moves to overturn
the award in court. Section 10 of the FAA sets forth explicit grounds on
modify the lower courl's confirmation of the award and remanded it back to the
arbitrators for further findings. !d.
II. Sands Bros., 749 N.Y.S.2d at 18; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511 (McKinney 2003).
12. 744 N.Y.S.2d 364 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
13. See In re Arbitration Between UBS Warburg L.L.c. and Auerbach, Pollak
& Richardson, Inc., No. 119163/00, 2001 WL 1586978 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 2,
2001); see also N.Y.L.J. Oct. 22, 2001, at 21.
14. UBS Warburg, 744 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
IS. See Stepben L. Hayford & Alan R. Pahniter, Arbitration Federalism: A
State Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REv. 175,202-04 (2002).
16. Professors Hayford and Pahniter have attempted this reconciliation, and
have outlined a "blueprint" of "arbitration federalism"-FAA preemption principles
for states to follow in deciding various arbitration-related issues to respect Supreme
Courl FAA jurisprudence, preserve a role for their own state's arbitration laws, and
respect the national policy favoring arbitration. This "blueprint" identifies issues in
three spheres, each of which preserves a different role for state law: the preemptive
core, the preemptive boundary, and the preemptive penumbra. See id. at 193-208.
2004] OVER-PREEMPTION OF STATE VACATUR LAW 5
which a court can vacatel7 an arbitration award. IS Additionally, forty-
nine of fifty states have statutoI)' provisions designating the grounds for
vacatur, some ofwhich are identical to the FAA grounds.19 Moreover, all
federal courts, and state courts to a more limited degree, have crafted
additional nonstatutol)' common law grounds for vacatur, including the
oft-cited "manifest disregard of the law" standard.2° Because parties
might file a motion to vacate in state or federal court, depending on
jurisdiction,21 for each vacatur motion, courts must decide the threshold
17. Section 11 of the FAA, provides additional grounds for modifying or
correcting an award.
18. Section 10(a) provides that:
[T]he United States court in and for the district wherein the award was
made may make an order vacating the award upon application of any party
to the arbitration (I) Where the award was procured hy corruption, fraud
or undue means. (2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in
the arbitrators, or either of them. (3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced. (4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or
so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, fmal, and definite award upon
the subject matter submitted was not made...."
9 U.S.c. § 10 (2003).
For an exhaustive analysis of federal courts' interpretation of these statutory
grounds, see Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standard/or Vacatur
o/Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REv. 731, 745-63 (1996).
19. Forty-seven of fifty states (excluding Georgia, Alabama, and West
Virginia), Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have adopted, in whole or in part, the
Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), which sets forth grounds for vacatur virtually
identical to section 10 of the FAA. For the text of the UAA, see
http://www.1aw.upenn.edu/blllulc/uarba/arbitratl213.htm (last visited February 17,
2004). While Georgia and West Virginia have not adopted the UAA, their
arbitration codes include vacatur grounds. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-13 (2003)
(recently codifying "manifest disregard of the law" standard); W. VA. CODE § 55-
10-4 (2003). Alabama has no statutory grounds of vacatur; instead its courts rely on
common law grounds exclusively. See Rayburn v. Bailes, 565 So. 2d 122, 125
(Ala. 1990).
20. For an extensive analysis of federal courts' interpretation on non-statutory
grounds, see Hayford, supra note 18, at 763-801.
21. It is well-settled that the FAA does not confer subject-matter jurisdiction in
federal court. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I,
25 n.32 (1983). Thus, only parties with diversity or subject-matter jurisdiction on
other grounds (e.g., a claim in admiralty) can file a motion to vacate in federal
court. Cf Greenberg v. Bear Stearns & Co., 220 F.3d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 2000)
(recognizing general rule, but permitting a fmding of jurisdiction on an investor's
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issue of whether section 10 of the FAA or the state law statute provides
the standard ofreview?2
Some scholars suggest that section 10 might preempt state vacatur
law if it differed from the FAA, but decline to engage in a detailed
analysis of the issue.23 Yet, while most state statutes are identical or
substantially similar to section 10 of the FAA,24 to the extent the grounds
are different, state courts have a strong interest in application of their
own states' law?5 Most significantly, ifa state court chooses to apply the
"manifest disregard of the law" standard for vacatur accepted by every
federal circuit (although with varying degrees of strictness) under the
motion to vacate award based on claim arising under the federal securities laws
when disposition of the matter "necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial
question of federal law") (internal quotations omitted).
22. A coro1lary issue beyond the scope of this Article is whether parties may
contractually expand the standards of judicial review of an award. Generally, state
courts do not allow parties to contractually provide for expanded court review. See,
e.g., John T. Jones Const. Co. v. City of Grand Forks, 665 N.W.2d 698, 703-04
(N.D. 2003) (collecting cases). In contrast, the federal circuits are split. See, e.g.,
Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 998-1000 (9th
Cir. 2003) (en bane) (collecting cases on both sides of circuit split).
23. E.g., I IAN R. MAcNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH,
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 10.8.2.4 (1999 Supp.) (stating that "[a]t present it is
not possible to tell whether the Supreme Court will hold any section other than FAA
§ 2 explicitly to supersede state law in state-court proceedings" but also asserting
that a state court's approach was "wrong" when it held its grounds for vacatur were
not preempted because they did not differ from the FAA grounds); Hayford &
Palmiter, supra note 15, at 176, 206-07 (acknowledging that the Supreme Court has
recognized that the FAA speaks "ambiguously" on issues such as the preemptive
scope of post-award judicial review and stating that it is an "interesting question" as
to "whether state arbitration law could modify the grounds for vacatur"); Stephen L.
Hayford, Federal Preemptian and Vacatur: The Bookend Issues under the Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL 67, 74 (stating that there is no
definitive Supreme Court case law specifying the preemptive effect of "back end"
issues of the FAA, including vacatur under section lOCal, although predicting that
preemption was "likely").
24. See Murray S. Levin, The Role ofSubstantive Law in Business Arbitration
and the Importance of Volition, 35 AMER. Bus. L.J. 105, 110 (1997) (noting that
most state statutes providing grounds for vacatur parallel those in the FAA).
25. See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REv. 317 (1997)
(cataloguing values of maintaining balance between state and federal law); see also
Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (2002)
(discussing values of federalism and asserting that the Rehnquist Court has
disregarded these important values in its preemption decisions).
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reasoning that it is part of the FAA,26 when that state has rejected such a
ground under state law, then the court will have trumped its own state's
policy to restrict judicial review of the merits of an arbitral award. This
is precisely the situation in Missouri, where a state court applied the
manifest disregard standard under federal law (without citing a United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit case),27 even though
Missouri courts have rejected it as a state law ground for vacatur?S
Likewise, in New York, the state version of manifest disregard allows
vacatur only for disregard of the law in violation of public policy,29
whereas the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's
manifest disregard standard as used by the Sawtelle court is slightly
broader?O
Conversely, if a state court has adopted a broader test of manifest
disregard than the federal court in that circuit, then the application of the
26. While every circuit has adopted the manifest disregard test, some circuits
interpret this standard far more strictly than others. Compare Williams v. Cigna
Fin. Advisors Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 762 (5th Cir. 1999) (permitting vactur for
manifest disregard only for awards that ''would result in significant injustice"), and
Geo. Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2000)
(allowing vacatur for manifest disregard only when an award directs the parties to
violate the law), with Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 2000)
(defining manifest disregard test to be when the relevant law is clearly defmed and
not subject to reasonable debate, and the arbitrators consciously chose not to apply
it). See generally Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why
Do Brokerage Firms Need Judicial Protection?, 72 CINN. L. REv. 415 (2004).
27. The Eighth Circuit permits vacatur for manifest disregard "where the
arbitrators clearly identify the applicable, governing law and then proceed to ignore
it." Gas Aggregation Servs., Inc. v. Howard, 319 F.3d 1060, 1069 (8th Cir. 2003).
28. See Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Schwartz, 969 S.W.2d 788,794-95 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1998) (citing Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Francis, 872 S.W.2d 484 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994), as rejecting manifest disregard as ground for vacatur in Missouri). The
Schwartz coutt stated the test to be where the "arbitrators correctly understood and
correctly stated the law but proceeded to ignore it." Id. at 795. The coutt confirmed
the award on the merits.
29. See Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 654 N.E.2d 95 (N.Y.
1995).
30. The Second Circuit allows vacatur when (I) "the law that was allegedly
ignored was clear, and in fact explicitly applicable to the matter before the
arbitrators," (2) "once it is determined that the law [was] clear and plainly
applicable, ... the law was in fact improperly applied, leading to an erroneous
outcome," and (3) "once the first two inquiries [were] satisfied," the arbitrator
subjectively knew of the law's existence and its applicability to the problem.
Duferco Int'l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping AlS, 333 F.3d 383,389-90 (2d
Cir.2003).
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federal manifest disregard standard would defeat the state's decision to
accord broader review to awards?l This is the scenario in Illinois, where
the state courts permit review for manifest disregard when the arbitrators
"deliberately disregarded what they knew to be the law,,,32 whereas the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit permits review
only when the award directs the parties to violate the law33 Thus, an
Illinois state court's improper application of the federal standard of
review on preemption grounds can have serious consequences for the
parties.
This Article will examine the state courts' approach to FAA
preemption on a vacatur motion since the most recent Supreme Court
FAA preemption decisions.34 This Article will demonstrate that, with
little or no analysis, state courts over-apply the FAA to commercial
arbitration awards,35 particularly the "manifest disregard" prong, causing
what I call "over-preemption" and frustrating their own state's interests
in the application of its arbitration law. Part II of this Article will briefly
review Supreme Court FAA preemption jurisprudence. Part III of this
Article will use illustrative state court decisions to demonstrate that the
state courts are applying FAA preemption in the vacatur context in an
inconsistent manner and thus over-preempt the FAA. Part IV of this
Article will show that, even after balancing the competing policy
concerns of federalism and judicial uniformity, this "over-preemption" is
not required under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence and that only in
very limited circumstances must a state court apply the grounds for
vacatur set forth in section 10 of the FAA. Part IV will also demonstrate
that state courts need not apply the "manifest disregard" prong as part of
the FAA, even if the FAA were held to apply. Part V will conclude by
31. If a state statute provides such broad grounds for vacatur as to amount to a
de novo appellate review of the merits, then the statute arguably undermioes the
purpose of the FAA to ensure the enforceability and fmality of arbitration awards.
This argument is addressed infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
32. Quick & Reilly, Inc. v. Zielinski, 713 N.E.2d 739, 743 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
33. Geo. Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2000).
34. A close examination of federal courts' treatment of FAA preemption issues
is beyond the scope of this Article because a federal court has far less occasion to
consider applying a state arbitration statute to a motion to vacate in federal court
and because section 10 of the FAA expressly applies in federal court. For the
federal approach to whether to interpret a choice-of-Iaw clause to include grounds
for vacatur, see infra note 93 and accompanying text.
35. This Article will not cover cases involving labor arbitrations governed by
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
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setting forth a framework for state courts to use when considering what
law applies to a motion to vacate that takes into account Supreme Court
precedent and policy considerations.
II. OVERVIEW OF SUPREME COURT'S FAAPREEMPTION DOCTRINE36
The Supreme Court has consistently announced that the FAA,
enacted in 1925 "to overrule the ~udiciary's long-standing refusal to
enforce agreements to arbitrate,',3 reflects a strong federal policy
favoring arbitration.38 In light of that policy, the Court views the FAA as
"creat[ing] a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to
any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the ACt.,,39 The Court
has further explained arbitrabili~ in this context to mean ''the duty to
honor an agreement to arbitrate.' 0
By its terms, the FAA governs agreements to arbitrate involving
"transactions in commerce.''''! The Court has interpreted this phrase very
broadly to include any transaction that in fact involves interstate
commerce, even if the parties did not anticipate an interstate impact.42
Thus, the FAA applies to virtually every judicial decision arising out of
an arbitration agreement.43
36. For general background on the preemption doctrine, see Susan Raeker-
Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption That Never Was: Pre-emption Doctrine
Swallows the Rule, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 1379 (1998). For a more detailed review of the
Court's modern commercial arbitration decisions, see Stephen L. Hayford,
Commercial Arbitration In The Supreme Court 1983-1995: A Sea Change, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1 (1995).
37. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985).
38. See. e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1,24 (1983) (recognizing a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements").
39. Id. at 24.
40. Id. at 25 n.32.
41. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2003).
42. See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 2037 (2003) (per curiam)
(applying FAA to debt re8tructuring agreements as "involving commerce");
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002) (applying FAA to
securities arbitrations); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-
74, 281 (1995) (interpreting the reach of the FAA broadly to all transactions
"involving commerce" and stating that '''involving' is broad and is indeed the
functional equivalent of 'affecting''').
43. MAcNEIL, supra note 23, § 9.5.3 (asserting that courts should assume that
all arbitrations are covered by the FAA unless a party shows otherwise).
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A. Conflict Preemption
It is also clear, however, that the "FAA contains no express pre-
emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the
entire field of arbitration.'M In other words, state arbitration laws have
some role in judicial decision-making arising out of an arbitration. As a
result, the Supreme Court has established the doctrine of FAA
preemption: the FAA preempts a state law that "actually conflicts with
federal law-that is, to the extent that it 'stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. ",45 And, the Court has analyzed the history of the FAA and
concluded that its primary purpose was to "require[] courts to enforce
privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in
accordance with their terms.',46 "Conflict preemption,,47 also means that
if a state law is consistent with the policies and purposes of the FAA, that
is, it does not undermine the enforceability of the arbitration agreement,
then the FAA does not displace applicable state law.48 Thus, in the
44. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
u.S. 468, 477 (1989).
45. Id. at 477 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). The
Court has identified three circumstances under which the Supremacy Clause (U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2) preempts state law: (I) when Congress has, in its statutory
language, made explicit its intent to preempt state law, (2) when a state law
regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended federal law to govern exclusively
("field preemption"), and (3) when state law actually conflicts with federal law
("conflict preemption"). English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990). The
Volt Court's quotation from Hines indicates that FAA preemption is a species of
conflict preemption.
46. Id. at 478. This would remedy the historical judicial hostility to enforcing
arbitration agreements.
47. For a fuller explanation of conflict preemption, see generally Patricia L.
Donze, Legislating Comity: Can Congress Enforce Federalism Constraints
Through Restrictions on Preemption Doctrine?, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'y
239, 246-55 (2000-01); see also Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 15, at 198 n.l13
(discussing FAA preemption as a type of conflict preemption).
48. Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Green Tree Financial Corp. v.
Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003), expresses this view. Id. at 2408 (Stevens, 1.,
concurring). He would have voted to affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of
South Carolina because the application of South Carolina law, as agreed to by the
parties to the arbitration agreement, does not conflict with the FAA. Id.; see also
Eckstrom v. Value Health Inc., 68 F.3d 1391, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (refusing to
preempt Connecticut statute providing time limit on filing of motion to vacate,
where parties' arbitration agreement contained a Connecticut choice of law clause,
because application of statute furthered pro-arbitration policies).
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absence of a conflict between state law and the FAA, courts need not
reach the preemption issue.
In Southland Corp. v. Keating,49 the Court expressly held that the
FAA preemption doctrine applies in state court as well as federal court.
In Southland, the California Supreme Court had held that a provision of
the California Franchise Investment Law that required judicial, not
arbitral, resolution of claims brought under the statute was not preempted
by the FAA.50 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state
provision contradicted FAA section 2, which declares arbitration
agreements irrevocable and enforces the parties' agreements according to
their terms.5! Thus, Southland represents the Supreme Court's first
explicit application of FAA preemption to a decision from a state colllf2
and the first occasion where the Court explicitly prevented a state court
from applying its own state law because it conflicted with the FAA.53
Agreeing with Justice O'Connor's strong dissent in Southland,54
some scholars have assailed the majority opinion as based on an
inaccurate interpretation of Congress's intent in enacting the FAA.55
Similarly, Justice Thomas's dissent in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson56 strenuously argued that the FAA does not apply in state court
and that Southland was wrongly decided and should be overruled.57
While this "barrage of criticism,,58 initially cast some doubt on the
continued vitality and expansion of the preemption doctrine, other
49. 465 U.S. I (1984).
50. Id. at 5.
5!. Id. at 10.
52. The Southland Court noted that it had already stated in Moses H. Cone that
,.. [t]ederallaw in the tenns of the Arbitration Act governs that issue in either state
or federal court.'" Id at 13 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24 (1983)). However, it had never expressly held a state
law to be preempted.
53. Id at 12-16.
54. Id at 21-36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
55. The primary proponent of this view is Professor Ian Macneil. See IAN R.
MACNEIL, AMERlCAN ARBITRATION LAW 139-47 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992); see
also Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 15, at 189-92.
56. 513 U.S. 265, 285-297 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice
Scalia).
57. Justice Thomas reiterated this view in his lone dissents in Doctor's
Associates, Inc. v. Casaratto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996), and Green Tree Financial Corp.
v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003).
58. Hayfold & Palmiter, supra note 15, at 178 n.IO.
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scholars have defended the Southland decision.59 In 1995, the Court
expressly rejected parties' arguments urging the Court to overturn its
Southland decision. 60 More recent Supreme Court arbitration decisions
do not even acknowledge litigants' attacks on Southland61 Thus, FAA
preemption appears here to stay.
Since Southland, the Court has ruled on four occasions that the FAA
preempts a state law.62 Professors Stephen L. Hayford and Alan R.
Pahniter astutely recognize that none of these decisions actually
preempting state law involve state arbitration law-laws that almost
uniformly further a pro-arbitration policy.63 Rather, the Court has
preempted state laws on non-arbitration matters that contain "lingering
anti-arbitration sentirnent.'.64 For example, in Perry,65 the Court
preempted a provision of the California Labor Law which provided that
wage collection actions could be pursued in state court, regardless of the
existence of an arbitration agreement.66 Similary, in Casarotto, the
59. E.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the
Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 101
(2002); Margaret Harding, The Clash Between Federal and State Arbitration Law
and the Appropriateness ofArbitration as a Dispute Resolution Process, 77 NEB. L.
REv. 397,460-68 (\998) (while agreeing that the decision was "contrary to the bulk
of the legislative history," nonetheless arguing that the decision was defensible on
policy grounds).
60. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995).
61. See Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. at 2411; Citizens Bank v. Alafabco., Inc., 123 S. Ct.
2037 (2003) (per curiam). In Bazzle, a case about the availability of class-wide
arbitration, like in preceding Supreme Court arbitration cases, numerous amici
briefs were filed attacking the foundations of the preemption doctrine.
Commentators predicted the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case to provide
a vehicle to limit or abdicate the FAA preemption doctrine. See, e.g., Justin Kelly,
Professors Urge Supreme Court to Overturn Southland Decision, ADRworld.com
(March 25, 2003), available at http://www.adrworld.com(last visited September 23,
2003). Those predictions were unfounded, as the plurality opinion did not mention
preemption.
62. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (\996) (Montana
statute requiring specific type of notice in contract containing arbitration clause);
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (New York law
precluding arbitrators from awarding punitive damages); Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (Alabama statute invalidating pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483
(1987) (California statute requiring wage collection actions to be resolved in court).
63. Hayford & Pahniter, supra note IS, at 195.
M. Id
65. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
66. Id at 490.
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Court held that the FAA preempted a Montana statute requiring that, to
be enforceable, an arbitration agreement must provide a very specific
notice (typed in underlined capital letters on the first page) that it is
subject to arbitration.67 Because this notice requirement applied only to
arbitration agreements and not contracts generally, the law singled out
arbitration agreements for hostile treatment and was displaced by the
FAA.68
B. Choice ofLaw Clause Exception
The other two decisions since Southland preempting state laws
explore the scope of FAA preemption and carve out another exception to
the FAA preemption doctrine. Faced with a challenge to a state court's
ruling that a state procedural rule did not have to yield to a conflicting
provision in the FAA, the Court established that the parties can avoid the
application of the FAA through a choice-of-law clause included in their
pre-dispute arbitration agreement in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v.
Board ofTrustees ofLeland Stanford Junior University.69
In Volt, the parties had entered into a construction contract. The
contract required the parties to arbitrate any disputes arising out of it and
contained a choice-of-Iaw clause providing that "'[t]he Contract shall be
governed by the law of the place where the Project is located"'-i.e.,
California law?O Under the contract in Volt, after one party to the
contract filed for arbitration, the other party invoked in a California state
court a provision under the California Arbitration Act that allowed a
party to make a motion to stay an arbitration proceeding pending
resolution of a related litigation proceeding between a party to the
arbitration agreement and third parties not bound by it.7l The California
court's ruling on the stay motion, while recognizing the general
applicability of the FAA to the contract because it involved interstate
commerce, interpreted the parties' arbitration agreement to incorporate
the California rules of arbitration and held them not preempted by the
FAA.72
67. Casarotlo, 517 U.S. at 683-89. For a detailed discussion of the background
and subsequent history of Casarotlo, see Harding, supra note 59, at 405-25.
68. Casarotlo, 517 U.S. at 687.
69. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
70. !d. at 470 (quoting the parties' construction contract).
71. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1281.2(c) (1989).
72. Volt, 489 U.S. at 471-72.
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The Court agreed, holding that section 4 of the FAA-authorizing a
party to an arbitration agreement to "petition any United States district
court . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the
manner provided for in such agreement,,73--{\id not pre-empt the
California statute. The Court reasoned that "application of [the
California statute] to stay arbitration under [the construction contract]
would [not] undermine the goals and policies of the FAA.,,74 The Court
noted that the FAA does not prevent "the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in the Act itself' and
thus parties to arbitration agreements can "specify by contract the rules
under which that arbitration will be conducted.,,75 Accordingly, "[w]here
... parties have agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration, enforcing
those rules according to the terms of the agreement is fully consistent
with the goals of the FAA.,,76
The Court's 1995 decision in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc. 77 applied the FAA preemption doctrine to a securities
arbitration claim by a brokerage firm customer where the customer
agreement contained a New York choice-of-law clause. In that case,
customers brought an arbitration proceeding against a brokerage firm for
mishandling their account. After a hearing, the panel awarded the
customers compensatory and punitive damages. The firm moved to
vacate the award of punitive damages in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, arguing that the parties' generic New
York choice of law clause incorporated New York's Garrity rule that
prohibited arbitrators from awarding punitive damages.78 The district
court granted the motion and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.79
The Court reversed, ruling that the FAA preempted the Garrity rule.
The Court found that the parties' choice-of-law clause was ambiguous
and did not expressly incorporate the New York rule precluding the
award of punitive damages in arbitration. When a clause is ambiguous,
the Court reasoned, '''due regard must be given to the federal policy
73. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2003).
74. Volt, 489 U.S. at 477-78.
75. Id. at 479.
76. Id.
77. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
78. !d. at 54-55 (citing Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354 (1976)).
79. Id. at 54.
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favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration
clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.",80
To distinguish this case from Volt, the Court highlighted the
difference in the procedural posture of the case: the Court was reviewing
the Seventh Circuit's (i.e., a federal court's) interpretation of the parties'
contract, rather than a state court's interpretation of a contract under its
state contract rules, as in Volt-an interpretation to which the Court gave
deference.8l Mastrobuono thus illustrates the difference in outcome on
an issue of FAA preemption for a case that reached the Supreme Court
from a federal circuit court rather than from a state's highest court. This
distinction is significant for state courts as it permits them to interpret
under their own state's rules of contract interpretation-without regard
for the FAA-whether the parties' choice of law clause included the
standards ofjudicial review of an award or not.
C. Preemption ofState Procedural Rules.
Volt and Mastrobuono express the Supreme Court's current
approach to FAA preemption. These decisions, seemingly in conflict,
have fueled further the state courts' difficulties in interpreting the FAA
preemption doctrine.82 Commentators also have difficulty reconciling
the two cases, as their results seem contradictory.83 One scholar has
critiqued the Mastrobuono Court's distinction of Volt as encouraging
forum-shopping-as it suggests that the Mastrobuono approach applies
only when a federal court is interpreting a choice-of-law clause.84
An alternative, more plausible distinction is that Volt involved the
preemption of a state procedural rule under the California arbitration
statute whereas Mastrobuono involved preemption of a substantive
principle of New York law-the rule that arbitrators cannot award
punitive damages.85 And the precise procedural rule at issue in Volt was
one favoring the use of arbitration as a dispute resolution process
80. Id. at 62 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 476).
81. Id. at 60 nA.
82. See Note, An Unnecessary Choice ofLaw: Volt Mastrobuono. and Federal
Arbitration Act Preemption, 115 HARv. L. REv. 2250 (2002).
83. See, e.g., Thomas A. Diamond, Choice of Law Clauses and Their
Preemptive Effect upon the Federal Arbitration Act: Reconciling the Supreme
Court with Itself, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 35, 56-58 (1997).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 61 ("If a state rule of arbitration procedure is implicated, Volt applies.
If a state rule ofarbitration substance is implicated, Mastrobuono applies.").
16 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICANARBITRATION [Vol. 3:1
whereas Mastrobuono involved a state law "reflect[ing] the 'ancient
judicial hostility to arbitration. ",86 Language in subsequent Supreme
Court opinions supports this distinction.87
As a result, while there is widespread consensus that the FAA
preempts substantive state laws that conflict with the substantive
provisions of the FAA,88 there is far less agreement on the scope of FAA
preemption of state procedural rules and the corollary issue of whether
the procedural provisions of the FAA apply in state COurt.89 Equally
unsettled is what rules can be classified as procedural rather than
substantive.9o
In federal court, the issue arises only if the parties' arbitration
agreement includes a choice-of-law clause designating a state's law. If
the clause specifically prescribes that a state's arbitration law applies,
then the court should honor the unambiguous intent of the parties. In
contrast, if the clause simply requires that a state's law governs disputes
arising out of the underlying contract, or other similarly generic
language, then it is more problematic for the court to ascertain the
86. Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 15, at 199 (quoting Mastrobuono, 514 U.S.
at 56).
87. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (noting
that Volt involved a state procedural rule that determined "only the efficient order of
proceedings; it did not affect the enforceability of the arbitration agreement itself').
88. Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 15, at 194-95 (identifying "preemptive
core"-substantive state laws that "invalidate arbitration agreements or limit the
matters that can be arbitrated" as clearly preempted by the FAA); Harding, supra
note 59, at 468-72 (collecting cases).
89. Professor MacNeil argues that the FAA should govern arbitration
exclusively and that there should be no role for state arbitration law in arbitrations
governed by the FAA. MAcNEIL, supra note 23, § 10.8.2.2. He asserts that FAA
exclusivity would (1) "avoid courts' mistakenly allowing state arbitration law to
limit or obstruct the FAA"; (2) simplify the landscape of arbitration law; (3) avoid
confusion in cases involving both federal and state law claims; and (4) preclude the
risk that state and federal courts would develop different FAA arbitration law, as
state courts would draw on the FAA only to fill gaps in coverage. He also
recognizes, however, that FAA exclusivity is not the current state of the law and
that there is some, albeit confused, role for state arbitration law in FAA arbitrations,
as long as it does not undennine the FAA's goals and policies. Id. § 10.8.2.3.
90. Professor Diamond notes that "[s]tate rules that prescribe the marme, in
which arbitration is to be conducted are procedural" and that "[s]tate rules that limit
arbitrators' authority by denying them the power to resolve a particular dispute or
grant a particular remedy are substantive." Diamond, supra note 83, at 61-62.
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parties' intent when they included that boilerplate clause.91
One could argue that the parties' generic choice-of-Iaw clause
includes a choice for the state's arbitration law as well as its substantive
law. Federal courts, however, generally do not interpret a choice-of-Iaw
clause to include a state procedural rule, including a procedural rule
governing the arbitration process.92 Indeed, most federal courts
addressing this issue have concluded that a generic state choice-of-Iaw
clause does not incorporate a choice for that state's vacatur grounds.93
Before Mastrobuono or even Volt, numerous state courts had
interpreted Southland to mean that state procedural rules were not
preempted.94 Applying Volt, one court held specifically that the FAA
91. See Charles Davant IV, Tripping on the Threshold: Federal Courts' Failure
to Observe Controlling State Law Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 51 DUKE L.J.
521,523 (2001) (arguing that federal courts improperly "invent" and apply a federal
common law of contract instead of state law of contract on threshold question of
arbitrability).
92. See Stone & Webster, Inc. v. Baker Process, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1177,
1182 (S.D. Cal. 2002) ("A general choice-of-Iaw clause will only be construed as
incorporating state substantive laws, NOT state procedural laws."); Jeereddi A.
Prasad, M.D., Inc. Ret. Plan Trust Profit Sharing Plan v. Investors Assocs., Inc., 82
F. Supp. 2d 365 (D.N.J. 2000) (ruling that generic choice of law clause does not
incorporate state statute of limitations for filing a motion to vacate). But see Sec.
Ins. Co. of Hartford v. TIG Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 322 (2d Cir. 2004) (following Volt
and construing generic California choice-of-law clause to incorporate a provision of
California arbitration law deemed to be procedural).
93. See Sovak, M.D. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 280 F.3d 1266, 1270, amended by
289 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating "a general choice-of-Iaw clause within an
arbitration provision does not trump the presumption that the FAA supplies the rules
for arbitration"); Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir.
2001) (crafting a default rule that if the parties' choice-of-Iaw clause does not
indicate parties' intent to opt out of FAA, then FAA rules apply); AT&T Co. v.
United Computer Sys., Inc., No. 99-56846, 2001 WL 389451, 7 Fed. Appx. 784,
787 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2001) (stating that FAA, not New Jersey law, provides grounds
for vacatur motion because such grounds "affects the allocation of authority
between courts and arbitrators"); Jacada (Europe) Ltd. v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies,
Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 744 (W.D. Mich. 2003). But see Int'l Techs. Integration, Inc.
v. The Palestine Liberation Org., 66 F. Supp. 2d 3, 9-10 (D.D.C. 1999) (applying
Virginia grounds to a motion to vacate where arbitration agreement contained
generic Virginia choice-of-Iaw clause).
94. See, e.g., Behnont Constructors, Inc. v. Lyondell Petrochemical Co., 896
S.W.2d 352, 355 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that "federal procedure does not
apply in Texas courts, even when Texas courts apply the [FAA]"); Marr v. Smith
Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 842 P.2d 801 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that FAA
does not preempt Oregon law precluding interlocutory appeal from order
compelling arbitration); McClellan v. Barrath Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 656, 658
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does not preempt state vacatur law, because "[t]he state statute does not
obstruct the congressional purposes and objectives.,,95 Since Volt and
Mastrobuono, many state courts have continued to hold that the FAA
does not preempt state procedural rules, as long as those rules do not
defeat the substantive right to arbitration granted by the FAA96 These
courts have thus applied state arbitration rules regarding procedural
matters to arbitrations governed by the FAA, even where the FAA has a
provision addressing that procedure-including FAA sections 4 (right to
a jury trial on motion to compel),97 12 (service of process of notice of
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that "the procedural provisions of the [FAA] are not
binding on state courts"); cf Baxter Health Care, Corp., v. Harvard Apparatus, Inc.,
617 N.E.2d 1018, 1020 n.2 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that FAA does not
preempt Massacbusetts arbitration law that does not effect the validity or
enforceability of the arbitration clause).
95. DeBaker v. Shab, 522 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that
Wisconsin grounds for vacatur and FAA "mirror each other" and are "nearly
identical"). Professor MacNeil harshly criticizes this opinion as "wrong," claiming
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals should have considered the possibility that the state
grouods could have been different from those of the FAA. MAcNEIL, supra note
23, §10.8.2.
96. E.g., Wells v. Chevy Chase Baok, F.S.B., 768 A.2d 620 (Md. 2001)
(collecting cases and holding that FAA does not preempt procedural state arbitration
laws uoless they discriminate against arbitration); Collins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 752
So. 2d 825, 828-29 (La. 2000) ("[S]tates are free to follow their own procedural
rules regarding appeals, unless those rules uodermine the goals and priociples of the
FAA.''); S. Cal. Edison Co of Am. v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 977 P.2d 769 (Ariz.
1999) (sarne); Superpumper, Inc. v. Nerland Oil, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 647, 651 (N.D.
1998) (stating that "a state is not obligated to altogether ignore its own procedural
requirements in light of the procedural aspects of the FAA, provided the state-
enacted procedure does not defeat the rights granted by Congress"); Weston Sees.
Corp. v. Aykanian, 703 N.E.2d 1185 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998); Manson v. Dain
Bosworth Inc., 623 N.W.2d 610, 614 (Mino. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that FAA
governs arbitrability of dispute and Minoesota law governs all other issues,
including procedural ones); Duggan v. Zip Mail Servs., Inc., 920 S.W.2d 200,203
(Mo. Ct. App. 1996) ("Our courts are not bouod by the procedural provisions of the
FAA and state procedural rules may be applied when arbitration is pursuant to the
FAA."); see also Suzanne H. Johnson, Note, FAA Pre-emption: When Should
Conflicting State Law Be Pre-Empted by the FAA?, 1999 1. DISP. REsoL. 191
(analyzing Weston and concluding that court reached correct result by holding that
FAA does not automatically preempt conflicting state procedural rules governing
arbitration as long as they do not defeat the substantive body of law uoder the
FAA).
97. Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., 926 P.2d 1061 (Cal. 1996) (ruling
that FAA section 4 did not preempt California rule permitting use of a summary
procedure on a motion to compel arbitration).
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motion to vacate)98 and 16 (appeals).99 Other courts hold that the FAA's
procedural provisions preempt state procedural rules. JOo These decisions
are difficult to reconcile across state lines.
III. STATE COURTS' INCONSISTENT USE OF FAA PREEMPTION OF
VACAfUR MOTIONS
As discussed above, since Volt and Mastrobuono, state courts have
been grappling with the scope of FAA preemption of state procedural
rules and have applied the doctrine in a confusing and inconsistent
manner. This section of the Article explores examples of this confusion
and inconsistency in several illustrative states-New York, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Texas and California10I_in one procedural context
only: vacatur motions and the grounds applicable to such a motion.! 02
98. Manson, 623 N.W.2d at 613 (holding that state civil procedural rule
requiring personal service of motion to vacate was not preempted by FAA section
12 permittiog service by mail).
99. Wells, 768 A.2d at 625 (boldiog state appellate procedural rule deemiog an
order compelliog arbitration to be a fioal and appealable judgment was not
preempted by FAA section 16 governiog appeals under the FAA); Collins, 752 So.
2d at 828-30 (ruliog that section 16 did not preempt Louisiana rule precluding
immediate appeal from order compelliog arbitration); Weston Secs. Corp., 703
N.E.2d at 1188-90 (holdiog that FAA does not preempt Massachusetts arbitration
statute's provision that did not permit an immediate appeal from an order
compelling arbitration).
100. 1745 Wazee L.L.C. v. Castle Builders Inc., Nos. 0ICA2560, 02CA0303,
2003 WL 21665020 (Colo. Ct. App. July 17, 2003); Wavedee Homes v.
McMichael, 855 So. 2d 493 (Ala. 2003) (applyiog FAA standards to motion to
vacate without discussion of preemption); Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Schwartz, 969
S.W.2d 788,795 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
101. I chose these states because of the frequency of arbitration io them, the
volume of arbitration decisions, the presence of a commercial center in the state,
and to represent a cross-section of geographic regions io the country and states
within different circuits. I referenced opioions from other states where they
mirrored opinions in the illustrative state.
102. This section of the Article will not consider cases where the FAA arguably
applied yet the state court did not consider the applicability of the FAA and thus
assumed state law vacatur grounds controlled. E.g., Boyhan v. Maguire, 693 So. 2d
659, 663 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (applyiog state law vacatur grounds to dispute
arisiog out of royalty agreement for services performed io another state); see also
MAcNEIL, supra note 23, § 9.5.4 (statiog that "[s]tate courts often ... seem happily
unaware that the FAA governs cases before them and apply state law (footnotes
omitted)). Additionally, this section will focus on cases decided after Mastrobuono,
as that decision, combioed with Volt, altered the FAA preemption landscape.
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Some state courts have declared that the FAA preempts all state vacatur
laws wholesale;103 others have narrowly limited the contexts in which it
will find that the FAA preempts its own state laws.104 Still other state
courts frame their analysis around whether the parties' arbitration
agreement includes a choice-of-Iaw clause. !Os
A. New York
Perhaps the clearest example of intrastate judicial inconsistency is in
New York. In Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy,106 the
Court ofAppeals addressed FAA preemption in the context ofthe parties'
New York choice of law clause. In that case, a former partner in a law
firm, invoking an arbitration clause in a partnership agreement, brought
an arbitration proceeding against his former firm seeking payments
allegedly owed to him following his departure from the partnership.
After losing the arbitration, the partner moved to vacate the award,
challenging the arbitrator's power.107 The New York Supreme Court
vacated the award on public policy grounds and the Appellate Division
affirmed.108
On appeal, the law firm contended that the FAA provided the
grounds for vacatur. The Court of Appeals disagreed, and ruled that the
state law grounds for vacatur under N.Y. CPLR section 7511 governed
103. E.g., Carpenter v. Brooks, 534 S.E.2d 641, 645 (N.c. Ct. App. 2000)
(applying FAA grounds to motion to vacate without analysis of scope of
preemption); Groceman v. Pulle Homes Corp., 53 S.W.3d 599, 601 n.2 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2001) (holding that FAA grounds apply to all vacatur motions involving
arbitrations where FAA applies).
104. E.g., Tim Huey Corp. v. Global Boiler & Mech., Inc., 649 N.E.2d 1358,
1361-62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (applying Illinois vacatur statute because the FAA only
preempts conflicting state law and parties' contractual choice ofTexas law, which is
identical to Illinois law, should be enforced under Volt).
105. See. e.g., First Mich. Corp. v. Mansour, No. 228521, 2002 WL 1011771
(Mich. App. May 17,2002) (applying FAA grounds where PDAA designated FAA
and New York law as governing); Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy,
654 N.E.2d 95 (1995) (New York choice-of-Iaw clause); cf Harding, supra note 59,
at 409 n.73 and accompanying text (asserting that state courts faced with a choice-
of-law clause must determine whether the parties intended to incorporate that state's
arbitration law as well as substantive law).
106. 654 N.E.2d 95 (1995).
107. Id. at 97-100.
108. Id. at 97.
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the dispute. I09 First, the court recognized that, while the FAA generally
governed the partnership agreement, the parties' New York choice oflaw
clause in the agreement displaced the FAA.11o Second, the court noted
that the choice oflaw clause explicitly provided that the only grounds for
vacating an award were those specified in CPLR sections 7509 and
7511.111 Thus, the Court of Appeals honored and gave effect to the
parties' "explicit and unambiguous choice of law" under Volt. ll2
Hackett left unsettled the issue of what law would govern in New York
where the arbitration agreement contained a generic choice oflaw clause.
Following Hackett, the lower courts in New York have
inconsistently used the FAA preemption doctrine to preempt state
statutory grounds governing motions to vacate. Thus, lower courts in
New York apply the FAA grounds (1) where the parties' arbitration
agreement does not contain a choice of law clause;113 (2) without
discussion of a choice of law clause;114 and (3) even where the parties
chose a state law to govern. 115
109. !d. at 100. CPLR section 7511 provides that, for a party who participated in
or received notice of the arbitration, an award "shall be vacated ... if the court fmds
that the rights of that party were prejudiced by: (i) corruption, fraud or misconduct
in procuring the award; or (ii) partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral,
except where the award was by confession; or (iii) an arbitrator, agency or person
making the award exceeded his power or so imperfectly executed it that a final and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made; or (iv) failure to
follow the procedure of [Article 75], unless the party applying to vacate the award
continued with the arbitration with notice of the defect and without objection."
CPLR § 7511(h)(1). Additional grounds exist for those who neither participated in
nor received notice of the arbitration. CPLR § 7511 (h)(2). The Hackett court held
that any other ground not listed in the statute is precluded, including manifest
disregard, unless such disregard is '''totally irrational or violative of a strong public
policy' and thus in excess of the arbitrator's powers." Hackett, 654 N.E.2d at 100
(quoting Maross Constr. v. Cent. N.Y. Reg'l Transp. Auth., 488 N.E.2d 67 (1985)).
110. In New York, only an explicit choice oflaw clause will displace the FAA.
For example, parties' membership in the New York Stock Exchange and their
agreement to arbitrate pursuant to its Constitution and Rules is not enough. Salvano
v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 647 N.E.2d 1298, 1301 (N.Y.
1995).
111. Hackett, 654 N.E.2d at 100.
112. Id. On the merits, the court reversed the lower court's vacatur, ruling that
the award should not have been vacated on public policy grounds. Id. at 100-02.
113. E.g., Halikia v. Warburg Dillon Read L.L.c., 759 N.Y.S.2d 288 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2000) (confirming NYSE arbitration award on FAA grounds in employment
dispute).
114. E.g., Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 754 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. App. Div.
2003) (discussed supra, notes 6-8 and accompanying text) (stating that the FAA
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Conversely, several recent vacatur decisions by lower courts in New
York have-without a discussion of a choice of law clause-applied the
CPLR grounds for vacatur to arbitration agreements governed by the
FAA either (1) based on the parties' New York generic choice of law
clause;116 or (2) without discussion of the preemption doctrine or a
choice-of-law clause.117 There appears to be little explanation for the
discrepancy.
governs employment disputes 10 the secUTIlles 10dustry and vacat10g punitive
damages portion of an award 10 favor ofa former employee uoder section 10 of the
FAA and "manifest disregard of the law" test); Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Bullseye
Sees., Inc., 738 N.Y.S.2d 27 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (vacat1og NASD award for
manifest disregard of the law).
115. In re Engel v. Refco, Inc., 746 N.Y.S.2d 826 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (applyiog
FAA to customer claim against fullues trader 10 NFA arbitration where customer
agreement specified lllioois law); In re R.C. Layne Constr., Inc. v. Stratton
Oakmont, Inc., 651 N.Y.S.2d 973 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (apply1og FAA grouods
where parties designated New York law); accord First of Mich. Corp. v. Mansour,
No. 228521, 2002 WL 1011771 (Mich. App. May 17,2002) (per curiam) (applyiog
FAA despite parties' choice of New York law); Carpenter v. Brooks, 534 S.E.2d
641,645 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (apply1og FAA grouods regardless of parties' choice
oflaw).
116. See, e.g., In re Arbitration Between UBS Warburg L.L.c. and Auerbach,
Pollak & Richardson, Inc., No. 119163/00,2001 WL 1586978 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct.
2, 2001), aff'd, 744 N.Y.S.2d 364 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (discussed supra, notes
12-14 and accompanyiog text) (vacating award 10 a securities dispute between
brokerage firms and tersely not1og that CPLR section 7511 governed the motion to
vacate because the parties' arbitration agreement 10cluded a New York choice of
law clause).
117. Sands Bros. & Co. v. Generex Pharms., Inc., 749 N.Y.S.2d 17 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2002) (discussed supra notes 9-11 and accompany1og text); In re Donald &
Co. Sees., Inc. v. Jones, 270 A.D.2d 56 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (brokerage customer
dispute); Markby v. Pa10ewebber Inc., 650 N.Y.S.2d 950 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996)
(NYSE arbitration of broker's employment dispute); Republic N.Y. Sees. Corp. v.
Lloyd, N.Y.L.J. 28, Oct. 27, 1997, at 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (same); Berman v.
Stratton Oakmont, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18, 1996, at 34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996). In
Sands, the parties' agreement contained a generic New York choice-of-Iaw clause,
but it did not contaio a pre-dispute arbitration clause. Rather, Sand Bros. was
compelled to arbitrate the dispute because it was aNew York Stock Exchange
member. Thus, the parties could not have contemplated that its choice-of-Iaw
clause would 10clude New York state arbitration law, as arbitration was not
contemplated at the time the parties entered into their bus10ess arrangement.
Telephone Interview with Richard Roth, Esq., Couosel for Sands Bros. (Sept. 29,
2003).
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B. Texas
The Texas courts are also inconsistent in their application of FAA
preemption to vacatnr motions. The Supreme Court of Texas recently
dodged the issue by invoking both the applicable FAA and Texas
grounds of vacatur,118 which were identical, in an FAA-governed
arbitration. II 9 The intermediate appellate courts apply the FAA grounds
on the broad assumption that the FAA preempts all state arbitration
lawl20 or because the parties' generic choice of law clause was not
explicit enough to include Texas vacatur law. l2l Thus, these courts have
over-preempted Texas vacatur law. Other courts apply the Texas
Arbitration Act due to the parties' explicit choice of law clause along
with a finding that Texas law does not conflict with the FAA,122 or due to
a finding that vacatur motions are procedural and thus are always
governed by state law.123
C. Florida
Generally, without discussion of FAA preemption, Florida courts
apply state law grounds124 to a motion to vacate an arbitration award
governed by the FAA.125 One court applied FAA vacatur grounds,
118. TEx. Crv. PRACT. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.008 (Vernon 2003).
119. Mariner Fin. Group, Inc. v. H.G. Bossley, 79 S.W.3d 30, 32 (Tex. 2002).
120. E.g., Thomas James Assoc., Inc. v. Owens, I S.W.3d 315, 319 (Tex. App.
1999); Thomas v. Prudential Sees., Inc., 921 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. App. 1996); accord
Warbington Constr., Inc. v. Franklin Landmark, L.L.c., 66 S.W.3d 853,856 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2001); McKee v. Hendrix, 816 So. 2d 30, 32 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001).
121. Tanox, Inc. v. Akin, Gumo, Strauss, Hauer & Feid, L.L.P., 105 S.W.3d 244
(Tex. App. 2003) (applying FAA including manifest disregard standard).
122. Tuco, Inc. v. Burlington N. RR Co., 912 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. App. 1995),
modified on other grounds, 960 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1997).
123. J.D. Edwards World Solutions Co. v. Estes, 91 S.W.3d 836, 839-40 (Tex.
App.2002).
124. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.13 (West 2003). Florida courts do not allow vacatur
for grounds other than those set forth in the statute (arbitrator misconduct or
procedural errors), and will not set aside an award for "mere errors of judgment
either as to the law or as to the facts." Schnurmacher Holding, Inc. v. Noriega, 542
So. 2d 1327, 1328 (Fla. 1989).
125. E.g., Avatar Props., Inc. v. N.C.J. Inv., 848 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003); Soler v. Secondary Holdings, Inc., 832 So. 2d 893 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002);
Dadeland Square, Ltd. v. Gould, 763 So. 2d 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Flavio
Dev. Corp. v. Laguna E. Club, 756 So. 2d 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). The
leading case is Cassedy v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 751 So. 2d
143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000), in which the court recognized, on the issue of the
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however, noting only that "[t]he parties agree that federa1law, not state
law, governs evaluation of the substantive aspects of [movant's]
claims.,,126
D. Georgia
In apparent precise oppOSItIon to Florida courts, when Georgia
courts acknowledge the application of the FAA, they conclude, without
discussion of the scope of preemption, that the FAA grounds for vacatur,
not the Georgia Arbitration Code,127 apply to motions to vacate.128 Thus,
Georgia applies complete preemption, ignoring Georgia state law even if
it does not conflict with the FAA. This represents another example of
over-preemption.
E. Illinois
illinois courts uniformly apply the Illinois Arbitration Act129 to
motions to vacate arbitration awards governed by the FAAYo These
cases in large part do not analyze the intersection of Volt and
Mastrobuono. Rather, they either cite to a conclusory decision of the
arbitrability of an attorney's fees award, that the FAA preempts only inconsistent
state law. With respect to vacatur grounds, however, the court did not discuss FAA
preemption, but applied state law grounds without discussion.
126. World Invest Corp. v. Breen, 684 So. 2d 221, 222 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996). In support, the court cited a 1981 case as holding that the FAA "supersedes
the Florida Arbitration Act where interstate commerce is involved." Id. (citing
Merrill Lynch, Inc. v. Melamed, 405 So. 2d 790 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
Melamed stated, however, that the FAA "supplants inconsistent state laws," not the
entire Florida Act without regard to its consistency with the FAA. Id. at 793
(emphasis added).
127. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-13 (2003).
128. E.g., Galindo v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc., 526 S.E.2d 141, 146 (Ga. Ct. App.
1999); Hilliard v. J.e. Bradford & Co., 494 S.E.2d 38, 41 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)
(noting that parties had not agreed to the application of any state's law). These
courts both cite a pre-Volt/Mastrobuono Georgia case, Hilton Construction Co. v.
Martin Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 308 S.E.2d 830 (Ga. 1983), which ruled that
the FAA applies to motions to vacate.
129. Grounds for vacating an arbitration award can be found in section 12 of
lllinois' Act. 710 ILL. CoMP. ST. ANN. 5/12 (West 2003).
130. E.g., Roubik v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 692 N.E.2d
1167, 1171 (Ill. 1998); Quick & Reilly, Inc. v. Zielinski, 713 N.E.2d 739,742 & n.1
(Ill App. Ct. 1999); Ryan v. Kontrick, 710 N.E.2d 11, 14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
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Supreme Court of Illinois that pre-dates Mastrobuono 131 or do not even
discuss the issue. Thus, while the lllinois courts reflect no inconsistency
in their automatic application of state law grounds for vacatur, they also
reveal no in-depth analysis of the scoge of FAA preemption and thus are
vulnerable to a preemption argument. 32
The one exception I have found to these general rules is the Illinois
appellate court decision in Tim Huey Corp. v. Global Boiler &
Mechanical, Inc. 133 In that case, the parties' arbitration agreement
designated Texas law to govern disputes arising from their contract. The
losing party moved to vacate the award in Illinois circuit court and cited
grounds under the FAA, claiming the FAA preempted state law grounds.
The Appellate Court disagreed, ruling that the FAA preempts only
"conflicting State law.,,134 The court also ruled that because the purpose
of the FAA is to enforce the parties' arbitration agreements, and the
parties designated Texas law, the Texas grounds for vacatur applied.135
In acknowledging and ultimately rejecting the moving party's
preemption claim, the Tim Huey court approaches the level of analysis
required by the Supreme Court in Volt and Mastrobuono.
F. The Exception: California
In a comprehensive and well-reasoned opllllOn, a California
appellate court has recognized the over-preemption and halted it in favor
of California arbitration law. Thus, in Siegel v. Prudential Insurance
Co. ofAmerica, 136 a former employee of a brokerage firm sued the firm
and a supervisor for wrongful termination. After the panel awarded
compensatory and punitive damages to the fonner employee, the
131. Raub v. Rockford Prods. Corp., 574 N.E.2d 636, 643 (Ill. 1991) (holding
that minois Arbitration Act, not FAA, provides grounds for vacatur motion "[u]nder
the [unspecified] circumstances of the instaot case").
132. Since minois recognizes "maoifest disregard" as a state law ground for
vacatur, Quick & Reilly. 713 N.E.2d at 743, a preemption argument is significaot,
because the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of "manifest disregard" is extremely
narrow. Geo. Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffaoy & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir.
2000).
133. 649 N.E.2d 1358 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
134. Id at 1361.
135. Id at 1362. Because neither party cited Texas vacatur cases in its brief, but
cited only federal aod minois cases, aod because the court noted that Texas aod
Illinois grounds for vacatur were identical as derived from the Uniform Arbitration
Act, the court cited Illinois cases in its decision. [d.
136. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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employee moved to confinn and the respondents cross-moved to vacate
the award in superior court. The trial court confinned the award and
denied the cross-motion to vacate.137 The respondents appealed on the
grounds that, inter alia, the panel acted in manifest disregard of the law
under the FAA.138
The California appellate court, following a thorough analysis,
concluded that the FAA did not preempt California arbitration law with
respect to the standard of review of an arbitration award. In reaching this
result, the court reasoned that:
1. "manifest disregard of the law" is not a recognized ground
of vacatur in California;139
2. "manifest disregard of the law" is not part of the FAA, but
is a judicially-created ground of review independent of the
FAA' 140,
3. the language of section 10 on its face suggested it did not
apply in state court; 141
4. the FAA has only limited preemptive effect in state court
when a state law undercuts the enforceability of an
arbitration agreement; 142 and
5. the California statute that prevents the review of the
merits of an arbitration award does not contradict the
purposes and policies of the FAA. 143
Thus, as opposed to section 10 of the FAA and the "manifest
disregard of the law" standard, the court reviewed the arbitration award
pursuant to the standards set forth in section 1286.2 of California's Code
of Civil Procedure, which did not allow review for manifest disregard of
137. Id. at 729.
138. Id. at 730.
139. Id. at 732.
140. Id. at 731.
141. Id. at 732.
142. Id. at 737.
143. !d. at 740; see also Paul Turner, Preemption: The United States Arbitration
Act, The Manifest Disregard of the Law Test for Vacating an Arbitration Award,
and State Courts, 26 I;'EPP. L. REv. 519 (1999) (written by author of Siegel opinion
and mirroring, but not citing, Siegel opinion).
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the law. l44 Accordingly, the court affinned the trial court's denial of the
motion to vacate.145
While one intermediate appellate court in California appears to have
thoroughly analyzed the intersection of current Supreme Court FAA
preemption jurisprudence with grounds for vacating an arbitration award,
most other states have addressed this issue in an inconsistent manner,
with courts within the same state in conflict (e.g., New York; Texas) as
well as courts in different states applying contradictory doctrines (e.g.,
California vs. Florida). This is significant where courts are vacating
multi-million dollar awards and the choice of the applicable standard of
review can affect the outcome.
Iv. OVER-PREEMPTION OF VACATIJR LAW FRUSTRATES STRONG PuBLIC
POLICIES
The inconsistency among and within the states, which has resulted
in over-preemption, raises several public policy concerns. The purpose
of vacatur law is to enforce the parties' agreement to arbitrate by
minimizing judicial intrusion into the dispute resolution process. Vacatur
law attempts to balance the competing considerations of the arbitration
parties' desire for finality, low cost, efficiency, and speed with the need
for some limited review of the process to ensure fairness and to provide
some minimal due process safeguards.146 Because "[t]he standard of
judicial review of arbitral awards defines the line between public justice
and private justice,,,147 preemption in the vacatur context has
implications for this public/private balance so fmely drawn.
Over-preemption defeats the objective of uniformity of state
arbitration laws, sought by the drafters of the Uniform Arbitration Act
144. The Siegel court did not mention the existence of a choice-of-Iaw clause in
the arbitration agreement, and, presumably, there was none. Under the court's
analysis, the presence of a choice-of-Iaw clause would not have altered the decision,
unless the parties expressly chose the FAA to govern. Since Siegel, at least one
court in California has ruled that a generic choice-of-Iaw clause incorporated
California procedural law, including a provision in conflict with the FAA. See
Mount Diablo Med. Ctr. v. Health Net of Cal., Inc., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607 (Cal. Ct.
App.2002).
145. See also Barker v. Vulcan Chern. Techs., No. C038586, 2002 WL 1788557
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2002) (following Siegel and applying California law, not
FAA, to motion to vacate in state court).
146. See Hayford, supra note 18, at 740-44.
147. KATHERINE V. W. STONE, ARBITRATION LAW 481 (Found. Press 2003).
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and Revised Unifonn Arbitration Act 148 To the extent that courts within
one state are inconsistently applying the preemption doctrine to vacatur
motions, litigants within that state have lost the predictability and rule of
law that governs citizen conduct. Interestingly, the lack of predictability
alleviates the risk of forum-shopping that could arise from the lack of
judicial uniformity. Because parties cannot predict what the result will
be even in courts within the same state, even at the same judicial level,
then they will not shop for a different forum depending on their predicted
results.
Additionally, and ironically, over-preemption of state vacatur law-
in the name of avoiding conflict with the FAA-undermines the public
policy reflected in the FAA to enforce the parties' agreement to arbitrate
on its precise tenns and in line with the parties' expectations. Those
expectations include arbitration's principle characteristic of finality and
the understanding that courts do not review the merits of the awards. To
the contrary, narrow grounds of judicial review reflect the strong belief
that parties to arbitration agreements are not permitted a second shot at a
favorable outcome, even if they are dissatisfied with the arbitrators'
decision.149 This is particularly problematic in a jurisdiction where the
applicable federal circuit's standard of review is broader than the state's
within that circuit150 If the parties, via their arbitration agreement,
expect state arbitration law to apply to the arbitral process, any over-
preemption would frustrate these expectations by applying a potentially
broader standard ofreview than contemplated.
In addition to the need for judicial uniformity and the respect ofthe
parties' arbitration agreement, another public policy frustrated by over-
preemption is judicial support of federalism. Scholars have recently
returned to basics, articulating the reasons why respecting federalism is
important to our democratic society and institutions.15l As described by
Professor Barry Friedman, those "values of federalism" include
increasing public participation in democracy, promoting accountability,
148. See NCCUSL Background, Website, Uniform Law Commissioners
(announcing its purpose is to "draft proposals for uniform and model law.s on
subjects where uniformity is desirable and practicable"), available at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusllDesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=O&tabid~I (last
visited April 8, 2004).
149. See Hayford, supra note 18, at 740-42. Any other result would transform
arbitrators into a court lower on the hierarchy than trial courts, as the trial courts
could then review the merits of the award for factual or legal errors.
ISO. Examples are provided supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
lSI. Massey, supra note 25; Friedman, supra note 25.
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making states laboratories for experimentation, protecting citizens'
health, safety, and welfare, enhancin§ cultural and local diversity, and
diffusing power to protect liberty.15 Professor Calvin Massey has
identified the values as the preservation of individual liberty, the desire to
maximize the satisfaction of citizen preferences, experimentation and
community, and the provision of political accountability by increasing
citizen participation in democratic processes. I53 Significantly, Professor
Massey stresses the judicial role in enforcing federalism, as opposed to
the role of political institutions, arguing that "the Court's role is to make
sure that the Constitution's elasticity offederalism is not lost by reckless
and untoward stretching of the fabric.,,154
State judicial over-preemption would be an unwarranted "stretching
of the fabric." While the FAA has expanded dramatically in coverage
since its passage, there is no reason it should eliminate state arbitration
law entirely. Why shouldn't a state court be responsible for striking the
appropriate balance between judicial review and arbitration finality? To
the extent state courts are applying the FAA in circumstances where they
do not need to, those courts are upsetting the balance ofpower created by
our federalist system, by granting more power to the FAA than intended
by either Congress or permitted by the Constitution. I55 To the extent that
state courts are applying state law where the FAA should apply, those
courts have abrogated Congress's purpose and intent in enacting the FAA
and have limited its reach improperly. For all of these reasons, a
coherent doctrine should be applied in all states to reflect the
compromise between Volt and Mastrobuono and to respect the
federalism concerns of states.
V. A FRAMEWORK To REDUCE OVER-PREEMPTION
A. Section 10 ofthe FAA Does Not Apply In State Court
As the Siegel court has concluded, I have concluded that, uuless the
parties' arbitration agreement specifically designates the section 10
152. Friedman, supra note 25, at 386-404.
153. Massey, supra note 25, at 438-54.
154. Id. at 461.
155. See Stephen A. Gardbanm, The Nature ofPreemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
767 (1994) (discussing constitutional basis of preemption). In my view, these
concerns dwarf the concerns regarding the risk of forum-shopping. See supra notes
84 & 89 and accompanying text.
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grounds as those governing a motion to vacate, or the state vacatur
grounds are so broad as to convert vacatur from a procedural rule to a
substantive re-allocation of authority to the courts, section 10 and the
judicially-crafted "manifest disregard" standard do not apply in state
courts. My conclusion emerges from the intersection of several
principles.
First, this conclusion is consistent with principles of conflict
preemption. The Supreme Court's preemption jurisprudence makes clear
that the FAA preempts state law only "to the extent that it actually
conflicts with federal law-that is, to the extent that it. stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."I56 And, because "the very purpose of the Act
was to 'ensur[e] that private agreements to arbitrate [were] enforced
according to their terms,,,,157 unless the parties designated applicable
law, application of state law grounds for a vacatur motion does not
conflict with the "body of federal substantive law of arbitrability,,158-a
body of law which does not dictate the standards of review of an
arbitration award.
Moreover, if the state law grounds for vacatur are as limited or more
so than the grounds specified in the FAA, then state law should apply,
even without a choice of law clause, because the state law does not
conflict with the federal grounds.159 There are strong public policy
reasons to support a state court's application of its own state's arbitration
rules. If a state's policy is expressed through a statute severely limiting
the judiciary's role in upsetting the finality of an award, a court would
further no FAA purpose by preempting such a law. States should be able
to enforce their laws designed to ensure that arbitration is expeditious
and final through strictly limited judicial review, without fear of FAA
. . 160
mtruslOn.
156. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 477 (1989) (emphasis added).
157. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (citing Volt,
489 U.S. at 479).
158. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I, 24
(1983).
159. MAcNEIL, supra note 23, § 10.9.2 (acknowledging that a state arbitration
law more favorable to arbitration than the FAA gives rise to no pre-emption
objection).
160. This argument is also consistent with Professors Hayford & Palmiter's
arbitration federalism blueprint. As they write, "[i]fthe state provision is not hostile
to arbitration-but seeks to rationalize the arbitral process by making it more
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Finally, if the parties did designate a particular law to apply, then,
unless a court construes that choice of law to preclude grounds for a
vacatur motion, the court should honor that choice and apply the chosen
law-whether it be state or federal. The FAA preemption doctrine could
possibly preclude application of that state's vacatur law only if that law
provides grounds broader than those allowed under the FAA.161
A second principle supporting my conclusion is that the precise
language of section 10 strongly suggests it applies only in federal court.
Thus, FAA section 10(a) provides that "the United States court in and
for the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating
the award upon application of any party to the arbitration.,,162 The plain
meaning of the statute sug~ests that section 10 is limited to application in
federal district COurts.16 Also, general principles of statutory
interpretation dictate that the plain meaning of a statute prevails even
b fi th d f · .. 164e ore e uty 0 mterpretatIon anses.
The Supreme Court, in dicta, has supported this analysis. For
example, in Volt, the Court suggests that FAA sections containing
language appearing to limit them to federal court mean they are limited
to federal court:
While we have held that the FAA's "substantive" provisions-
§§ I and 2-are applicable in state and federal court, we have
never held that §§ 3 and 4, which by their terms appear to apply
only to proceedings in federal court, see 9 U.S.c. § 3 (referring to
proceedings "brought in any of the courts of the United States");
§ 4 (referring to "any United States district court"), are
nonetheless applicable in state court ....165
Thus, the Supreme Court considers the language of the statute referring
to federal court to be indicative of congressional intent not to have
procedural sections of the FAA apply in state court.
expeditious, fair, or legitimate--the provision fits the blueprint." Hayford &
Palmiter, supra note 15, at 204.
161. See discussion infra notes 171-72 and accompanyiog text.
162. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2003) (emphasis added).
163. Hayford & Pahniter, supra note 15, at 195.
164. E.g., Dep't ofHous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 134-35 (2002).
165. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 477 n.6 (1989) (citations omitted); see also Allied-Bruce Termioix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 289-90 (Thomas, J., dissentiog) (notiog language of FAA
sections, iocluding section 10, on their face apply only 10 federal district court).
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A third principle supporting my conclusion is the fact that vacatur
law is more aptly characterized as procedural, not substantive, in
nature.166 The federal law actually preempting conflicting state law is
the substantive principle that parties' arbitration agreements should be
enforced on equal footing as ordinary contracts. Vacatur law prescribes
the very narrow grounds167 on which a court will second-guess the
arbitrators' decision. Vacatur does not challenge the determination that
the parties had an enforceable arbitration agreement. Because vacatur is
a courtroom procedure providing for limited judicial review of the
arbitration process, preemption of rules limiting the enforcement and
interpretation of a contract is inapposite.1 68
Some courts have characterized the vacatur rules as substantive, not
procedural.169 These courts reason that, because judicial review of an
arbitration award provides the courts with some oversight authority over
the arbitrators, the standards of review affect the allocation of power
between arbitrators and courts. This allocation ofpower goes to the heart
of the effectiveness of arbitration as a dispute resolution process and,
therefore, affects substantive rights of the disputants. 170
1 would argue that the characterization of vacatur as substantive
rather than procedural should be limited only to the situation where a
state authorized a broad de novo review of an award. In this
166. E.g., Stulberg v. lntermedics Orthopedics, lnc., 997 F. Supp. 1060, 1063
(N.D. 111. 1998) (holding that the applicable standard of judicial review is a
procedural issue); Atl. Painting & Contracting lnc. v. Nashville Bridge Co., 670
S.W.2d 841, 846 (Ky. 1984) (stating that "there is nothing in the Federal Arbitration
Act ... remotely suggesting that the 'motion to vacate' procedure ... has any
application at all to such state action" and holding that "procedural aspects [of the
FAA] are confmed to federal cases").
167. lndeed, modem arbitration statutes preserve the notion that judicial review
ofarbitration awards should be strictly limited to support the strong policy favoring
arbitration and to further the objectives of the parties to resolve their disputes
quickly, inexpensively, and with fmality. See generally MAcNEIL, supra note 23, §
40.1.4 (reviewing policies behind judicial reluctance to vacate, modify or correct
awards).
168. Cf Diamond, supra note 83, at 61-62 (defming as procedural the process for
confrrroing an award).
169. E.g., AT&T v. United Computer Sys., lnc., No. 99-56846, 2001 WI.
389451,7 Fed. Appx. 784, 787 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2001); Edward D. Jones & Co. v.
Schwartz, 969 S.W.2d 788, 795 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
170. AT&T, 7 Fed. Appx. at 787 (stating that grounds for vacatur motion "affects
the allocation of authority between courts and arbitrators"); Edward D. Jones &
Co., 969 S.W.2d at 795 (holding that grounds for vacatur are substantive in nature,
not procedural, because "they create, defme and regulate rights').
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circumstance, the parties' choice of the finali~ of arbitration as a means
of dispute resolution would be threatened. 71 Courts could permit
lengthy appeals in which the courts second-guessed the merits of the
decision of the arbitrators. This would constitute a re-allocation-from
the arbitrators to the court8---Qf the authority to decide parties' disputes
with finality and then would substantively alter the nature of arbitration
as contemplated by the FAA.
While, of course, a statute authorizing such broad judicial review
would be anti-arbitration and inconsistent with the spirit of the FAA, in
reality, no state currently authorizes such broad review. Moreover, most
states' public policies support extremely limited review of the merits of
awards to reinforce the expeditious and inexpensive nature of
arbitration.172 Any vestigial state anti-arbitration sentiment is expressed
through laws singling out arbitration agreements for hostile treatment
rather than laws designed to increase state court dockets once parties
submit to arbitration. Therefore, while in theory vacatur could be
transformed into a substantive rule if stretched to its logical extreme, no
state stretches it that far and thus preemption concerns do not arise.
B. Manifest Disregard is Not Part ofthe FAA
A corollary principle to this framework is that the manifest disregard
prong also does not apply in state court, unless that state has adopted the
test under state law. Most courts characterize this standard as non-
statutory, part of federal arbitration law but not part of the FAA.173
171. See Hayford, supra note 18, at 741-42 ("The public policy reflected in lbe
Federal Arbitration Act is intended to give effect to lbe bargain [of parties to forego
resort to lbe courts in order to secure lbe benefits of arbitration] and to hold lbe
parties to it by enforcing lbe agreement to arbitrate and making it very difficult to
secure judicial vacatur of objectionable arbitration awards."); Amy Schmitz, Ending
A Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA.
L. REv. 123 (2002) (arguing for narrow review of awards to meet parties'
expectations lbat arbitration has finality).
172. E.g., Moncharsh v. Hei1y & Blaise, 832 P.2d 899, 904 (Cal. 1992);
P1ymoulb-Carver Reg'l Sch. Dist. v. J. Farmer & Co., 553 N.E.2d 1284, 1285
(Mass. 1990).
173. Hoeft, 1lI v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2003); Siegel v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726, 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(collecting cases); Warbington Constr., Inc. v. Franklin Landmark, L.L.C., 66
S.W.3d 853 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (declining to include manifest disregard as
ground of vacatur under FAA); see also Julie K. Bracker & Larry D. Soderquist,
Arbitration in the Corporate Context, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 18-19
(identifying "manifest disregard" as a common law, nonstatutory ground of
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Because the need for preemption arises when the congressional statutory
scheme of the FAA conflicts with state law, federal laws developed by
the judiciary should not displace state arbitration law. In other words, as
long as the federal common law does not reflect congressional intent,
preemption is irrelevant. Thus, state courts should not apply that prong
if, under state arbitration law, manifest disregard is not a recognized
ground ofvacatur.
This is consistent with conflict preemption principles. Because the
manifest disregard standard supplements statutory grounds for vacatur,
application of this ground can only make it easier for losing parties to
upset the arbitration panel's findings and award. Thus, applying a state
rule that precludes the manifest disregard ground cannot contradict the
pro-arbitration policy of the FAA; to the contrary, by reducing the
avenues to upset the arbitration outcome, the state rule supports the pro-
arbitration policy. Therefore, state courts should not feel compelled to
apply a manifest disregard standard to a vacatur motion on preemption
grounds.
C. State Courts ShouldApply State Vacatur Law Unless Those Grounds
Conflict with the Substantive Principle ofArbitrability ofthe FAA
As discussed earlier, Professors Hayford and Palmiter provide a
blueprint for states to preserve a role in arbitration federalism. 174 That
blueprint expressly contemplates that, on the issue ofpost-award judicial
review, a matter within the FAA preemption "boundary," the states
should playa useful role in setting the parameters of preemption while
furthering the strong pro-arbitration national public policy.175 I propose
the following framework to meet these goals and to provide guidance to
a state court deciding a motion to vacate:
vacatur); Hayford, supra note 18, at 774-78, 810-19 (terming "manifest disregard"
the "seminal nonstatutory ground for vacatur" but offering a theory to reconcile the
standard with the FAA). But see Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs.,
Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003) (en bane) (classifying "manifest disregard of the
law" standard under section 10(a)(4) of the FAA-which permits vacatur where
arbitrators "exceeded their powers"); Groceman v. Pulle Homes Corp., 53 S.W.3d
599, 602 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that manifest disregard is a vacatur ground
under the FAA); Int'l Bank of Commerce-Brownsville v. Int'l Energy Dev. Corp.,
981 S.W.2d 38, 48 (Tex. App. 1988) (holding that parties' choice of FAA includes
manifest disregard and noting that Texas law includes the analogous ground of
"gross mistake").
174. See Hayford & Pahniter, supra note 15.
175. Id. at 178.
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1. The court must fIrst determine whether the arbitration
agreement is governed by the FAA, i.e., whether the
underlying transaction involves commerce. Because the
Supreme Court interprets that phrase extremely broadly,
virtually any commercial transaction is likely to be
controlled by the FAA. If the FAA does not govern, then
the court need not examine issues of FAA preemption and
can apply either the parties' chosen vacatur law or that
court's state vacatur law.
2. If the parties' arbitration agreement includes a choice-of-
law clause designating a particular state's law as governing
the dispute, then, under that state's law of contract
interpretation, the court must determine whether the clause
refers to state substantive law governing the underlying
contractual relationship, or whether it also includes state
arbitration and/or procedural law governing the arbitration
process.176 The court's determination on this issue will
then designate whether state law grounds of vacatur or
section 10 of the FAA controls the motion to vacate.
3. If the parties' arbitration agreement does not contain a
choice-of-Iaw clause, or the choice-of-Iaw clause does not
include arbitration law, then the court must examine the
state arbitration law setting forth grounds for vacatur and
make a determination whether applying those grounds
would conflict with the substantive principle of the FAA-
to enforce parties' arbitration agreements according to their
terms. If they do not, then the court can apply state vacatur
law; if they do (e.g., if state law grounds provide for a
broad de novo standard of review), then the court should
apply section 10 of the FAA.
4. Even if the state court determines that the FAA applies, the
court need not include the manifest disregard standard of
review. Only if applicable state law includes manifest
176. Practically speaking, this is a very subjective and difficult determination for
a court to make, as parties rarely discuss the meaning ofboilerplate language.
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disregard as a test should the state court apply that
standard.
Vl. CONCLUSION
Applying this framework to vacatur motions filed in state court
should avoid over-preemption of state vacatur law. While many scholars
have concluded that the Supreme Court's recent FAA jurisprudence has
sounded the death knell for state arbitration law, state courts need not
fear the preemptive effect of the FAA. Reducing the grounds available
to vacate a multi-million dollar arbitration award can only strengthen the
finality of arbitration awards, and fulfill parties' expectations that a
choice of state vacatur law---either by contract through a choice-of-Iaw
clause in the pre-dispute arbitration agreement, or by filing a motion to
vacate in state court-will result in the application of state law.
